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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. FLECK; NORMAN A.
NELSON; JAMES A. SUCHALA·
RICHARD A. WEBER; and
'
ROBERT ROBBINS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
NATIONAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
INC., a Utah corporation;
'
SKI PARK CITY WEST, INC., a
Utah corporation; ENSIGN
COMPANY, a limited partnership; and WILLIAMS. RICHARDS ·
Trustee, and THE TRAVELERS
'.
INDEMNITY CO. ,

No. 15480

Defendants-Appellants.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' statement of facts takes two quotes out of
context and ignores unfavorable findings of fact made by the
court, which are supported by the evidence.
In this action plaintiffs, as contract buyers of unimproved land, seek to recover damages they incurred because of
failure of the developers of the area to install streets and
utilities.

One of the developers, from whom plaintiffs bought,

agreed that the improvements would be installed and the other
developers gave an indenture and a bond to the county guaranteeing their installation (Ex. 8P).
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Time For Performance
Under the indenture furnished,the improvements were to be
installed two years from the recordine of the final plat.

It

made no provision whatseover for any extension of time for performance.

The quote on Page 3 of appellants' brief combines

wording from the indenture and from the bond securing same.
In the language of the bond there is the provision that the
surety consents to any modifications of the contract which may
be agreed upon, including any extensions of time, but that is
merely usual suretyship language which permits principals to
change the agreement without going back to the surety for its
consent.
and fixed.

The time for performance of the indenture is clear
It was two years after the recording of the plat.

The court found that the final plat was recorded February 2,
1970 and that "the time for performance of the obligation to
install improvements ... has expired."

(Finding No. 4, Tr. 123)

Appellants assert that they are not in default because the bond
was not "called."

Appellants are erroneously treating the

indenture as if it were an agreement to do something upon demand, which it is not.
Appellants then take exactly the opposite tack and state
that more than two years had passed prior to the time plaintiffs' Uniform Real Estate Contract was executed, thereby
implying that the time for performance of the indenture had
expired prior to the time plaintiffs acquired any rights.
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In

so stating appellants ignore the fact that the Uniform Real
Estate Contract was an outgrowth of the original obligation evidenced by an earnest money agreement whereby plaintiffs had
agreed to purchase the lots.

Said earnest money agreement was

dated December 29, 1971, prior to the expiration of the two-year
period.

Appellants also ignore Finding No.11 (Tr.124) which

states:
On December 29, 1971, the date plaintiffs
entered into the earnest money agreement
whereby they purchased the lots, the time
for performance under the performance bond
had not expired.
Appellants As Developers
Appellants state that they were in no way involved "with
the plaintiffs' land vendor."

There is no finding to that effect.

The evidence is to the contrary (Tr.167,168).

Furthermore, the

obvious utlimate fact is that appellants must have been involved
with the land developers or they would not have guaranteed the
installation of the improvements.
Prior Liens
Appellants state that the developers had placed liens
against the entire subdivision, that plaintiffs' interests have
been foreclosed and that plaintiffs made no attempt to obtain
releases of their land from these liens.

Appellants ignore

Finding of Fact No.15 (Tr.124) which states:
Defendants have abandoned their plans to
develop the subdivision and to install the
improvements. Plaintiffs could have protected their ownership interests as contract
buyers against the lien created by Exhibit 6P,
and would have done so had the lots had sufficient value. The failure to install improvements caused the lots to have insufficient
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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value to warrant further investment
of funds by plaintiffs, and further
investments would have been uneconomic.
The abandonment of the subdivision by
defendants caused plaintiffs to lose
interest in their contract and to lose
title to the lots. Plaintiffs' damage
accrued prior to the time they determined
not to make further investments in the
lots and thereby lost title thereto.
Plaintiffs minimized their losses by not
making any further investment.
Impossibility of Performance
Appellants state that the planned development has now been
entirely changed and that it would now be impossible to install
the improvements, and imply that this insulates appellants
from damages.

Such ultimate conclusions are fallacious for

the following reasons.
1.

It might be difficult but not "impossible''
to install improvements even though it
might involve obtaining consent of the new
owner.

2.

The fact that there is a new owner is a
direct result of the failure of the developers to perform under the indenture and
bond.

3.

Plaintiffs are not seeking specific performance so present inability to perform
is immaterial.

A R G U ME N T
Plaintiffs are Third-Party Beneficiaries
Travelers contends (p.7) that the indenture and bond,
pursuant to which plaintiffs were awarded judgment, should
have been construed as being for the benefit of the county only
and not for the benefit of interested property owners.

-4-
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Travelers cites Schwingharrnner v. Alexander (1968), 21 U.2d 418,
446 P.2d 414, as authority therefor.
no relationship to the case at bar.

That case factually has
It involved an escrow

agreement wherein the lender, Prudential Federal Savings,
received for its own protection a deposit to assure completion
of a home.

The holding of the case was that Prudential had no

intent to benefit the home owner as a third party and that the
lender, Prudential Federal Savings, was not liable

to the

owner for allegedly improperly paying the escrowed funds to
the contractor.

We agree with the statement of law contained

therein, that those third parties who are only incidentally
benefited without any intention of the promisee that they
should have rights, are incidental beneficiaries and cannot
sue; but applying the classifications therein stated, plaintiffs here are "donee beneficiaries," not "incidental beneficiaries."
Travelers argues that there is no evidence that Summit
County intended that plaintiffs should be third-party beneficiaries.

The evidence before the trial court consisted of the

indenture and bond (Ex. 8P) and Ordinance No. 58 of Summit
County (Ex. 9P) .
Ordinance No. 58 under which the bond was required
contemplates that the landowners shall be the beneficiaries
of the requirements relating to the improvements.

The ordi-

nance provides:
Whenever the subdivider develops a subdivision a portion at a time, such development
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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shall be in an orderly manner and in such
a way that the required improvements will
be
continuous and all of the said im¥rovements will be made available fo:r-the
ull effective and practical use and
enjoyment thereof £1. the lessees or
rantees of an of the lands subdivided
wit in t e time erein e ore speci ie .
Sec. 7B2
The ordinance also reflects that prospective purchasers
are being protected in that it requires notice to purchasers
of sulillller home subdivision lots that the usual requirements
for subdivisions relating to streets and water have been waived.
The ordinance provides:
For Sulillller Home Subdivisions that are submitted in accordance with the Summer Home
Subdivision provisions of these regulations
the following statement shall be required
on the final plat; i.e.,
Notice to Purchaser of Summer Home
Subdivision Lots:
This subdivision has been approved in
accordance with the Summer Home Subdivision provisions of the Subdivision
Regulations of Summit County which
waive the requirements for the provision of a dedicated public street and
reduce the requirements for an approved
water supply system to State Board of
Health Summer Home Standards for such
Water Supply System.
Sec. 5C2
The ordinance further reflects that prospective purchasers
are being protected in that it prohibits sale of lots until
after compliance with its requirements.
No street improvements or utilities shall be
installed until after approval of the final

-6-
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plat by the County Surveyor or Engineer.
No lots included in such plat shall be
purchased, sold, exchanged, nor offered
for sale or exchange and no construction
of ~uilding~ upon such lots shall begin
until the final plat is so approved and
recorded.
Sec. 5E2
The wording of the indenture and bond is consistent with
the obvious objective, which is to guarantee interested parties,
including landowners, that the improvements will be put in.
The indenture states:
Principals hereby agree to cause the
various improvements ... to be installed
on or before two (2) years from recordation of the final plats.
The bond recites that it is guaranteeing that principals
"will install said improvements."

(Ex. 8P)

The trial court made Finding of Fact No. 5 (Tr. 123):
Plaintiffs, as purchasers of lots in said
subdivision, are beneficiaries of the
indemnity and performance bond. Said bond
was intended for the benefit of purchasers
of said lots.
The finding of fact not only is not erroneous, but also
is controlling upon this court since this is an action at law
for damages.
Travelers argues that it should not be liable because
plaintiffs could recover against their seller.
non sequitur.

This is a

Both are liable, but Travelers is solvent.

Travelers argues (p.10) that Summit County is the only
proper party plaintiff on the bond and cites four California

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cases in support thereof.

1

Three of these cases involve a

California statute requiring that a bond be furnished.

The

California courts properly looked at not only the wording of
the bond, but at the statute requiring the bond in determining
whether or not anyone other than the county was an intended
third-party beneficiary.

They all concluded that because of

the wording of the statute and bond there was no intent that
the land owners should have a direct cause of action as a
third-party beneficiary.

The Morro language, which Travelers

quotes, shows that California was determining intent:
It is the county which is indemnified
by the express terms of the bond against
loss from 'all cost and damage which ...
it may suffer' from Westfall's default
either in building the roads or in failing to 'fully reimburse and to repay the ...
county all outlay and e({'ense which ... it
may incur in making goo any ... default.,.(emphasis added)
We have no quarrel with the result of the California cases
considering the wording of the statute and bonds which they
were construing.

The case at bar is construing language in the

bond and ordinance, both of which, when construed together,
indicate that a third-party beneficiary is intended to be
benefited.

1

Evola v. Wendt Construction Co. (1959), 17 C.A.2d 21, P.2d 498;

Ragghiajti v. ~ (1961) ' 16 Cal. Rptr. 538;
M:>rro Palisades
. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1959)
52 C.2d 397, 340 P.2d 628

-8-
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In the Morro case the reference to recovery by a thirdparty beneficiary was only an incidental part of the decision,
inasmuch as the county had actually assigned its right to the
plaintiff.

The court held that the county could not do so, and

that one of the landowners should not be in the position of
recovering for all damage arising out of failure to perform.
Morro

was attempting to recover the entire costs of the improve-

ments for himself personally.

Plaintiffs here seek to recover

only their own damages.
The Evola case held that inasmuch as the ordinance requiring the furnishing of a bond required a performance bond instead
of a payment bond, an unpaid supplier was not intended as a
third-party beneficiary.

Such reasoning implies that, had a

payment bond been required, the materialmen could have recovered.
The

Ra~anti.

case follows the Evola case, with the same

reasoning.
A fourth California case 2 cited by Travelers was decided,
not upon the basis that a third-party beneficiary had no right
to sue, but rather upon the basis that a condition precedent
had not been met, so that there was no liability under the bond
to anyone.
Travelers argues (p.13) that Summit County has not "called
for the improvements to be made" and that therefore Travelers
should not be liable.
2

The bond expressly provides that ir;iprovements

City of Los Angeles v. M=line (1936) 14 C.A. 522, 58 P.2d 690
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should be completed by a given date and the court expressly
found that the improvements had not been put in and that there
was a default.

(Findings 3, 4, 6, 8; Tr. 12 3)

When a party

has agreed to perform by a given date no demand is necessary.
(Bjork v. April Industries (1976)

U.2d

, 547 P.2d 219)

Travelers argues (p.13) that Summit County has not assiB!led
any of its rights to plaintiffs and that therefore plaintiffs
should not recover.

The whole concept of a third-party benefi-

ciary's right to sue assumes that there is no assignment.
Travelers cites a Missouri case.

3

That case involved a

bond guaranteeing the installation of a sewer system.

The

court there held that the bonding company was not liable in
tort to the landowner for the washing away of his property when
the sewer system was not installed.

The basis of the decision

was that the language of the ordinance and the bond indicated
that the bond was not intended to cover the tort,

particularly

inasmuch as the language expressly stated that the city council
could resort to the bond to complete the improvements.

The

court recognized that had the ordinance and bond reflected an
intent to benefit third-party beneficiaries, their rights would
be recognized.
The Uew York supplement case cited by appellant 4 merely
held that from the language of the bond it was apparent

3
4

City of Universi!:t City v. Frank Miceli & Sons R & B Co. Cit>. 1961)

347 s.w.2<r31

J

&J Tile Co., Inc. v. Feinstein (1973) 348 N.Y.S.2d 783 Sp.Ct.,
App. Div.
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that there was no attempt to benefit materialmen and that they
were therefore not proper third-party plaintiffs.
Travelers argues (p.14) that the bond does not specifically provide that third parties may recover.

Among the many

cases that recognize that there need be no specific reference
to the right of a third party in order for it to be a thirdparty beneficiary entitled to recover are Walker Bank & Trust
Co. v. First Security Corporation, 9 U2d 215, 341 P.2d 944, 946
in which First Security was held liable to children who sued
as third-party beneficiaries under First Security's agreement
with the mother of the children, that it would pay premiums
upon her life insurance.

The life insurance had lapsed, prior

to her death, because of the default of First Security.
court said that First Security's

The

"failure to do so renders it

liable to the beneficiaries who were harmed thereby despite
lack of privity between them."
Another Utah case so holding, and quite similar factually
to the case at bar, is Deluxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 U. 144,
208 P.2d 1127,1132.

In that case it was held that materialmen

were protected by a performance bond and could recover as thirdparty beneficiaries.

The position of the bonding company was

that inasmuch as the bond furnished was a performance bond
rather than a payment bond, guaranteeing payment to the materialmen, the materialJren could not recover as third-party beneficiaries.

The court there determined, considering the bond, the

statute requiring same, the contract and the cotmnon law, that
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"circuity" of having the promisee sue the surety and then
having the promisee protect the owner was to be avoided, and
that the materialmen were third-party beneficiaries and could
sue the surety even though not referred to in the bond.

This

court stated:
It is not always quite clear what is meant
when the courts say that the 'intention' of
the parties is controlling. There does not
seem to be any basis for holding that, although a performance of the contract will
necessarily and directly benefit the third
person, his remedy depends upon an intention on the part of the parties to the contract that he shall have the right to sue
thereon. While the intention of the parties
controls in the creation of rights under the
contract, and in determining the things
required by the contract to be done by the
parties, it would seem that, once the right
is created or the duty is imposed in favor
of the third person, the law furnishes the
remedy, regardless of the intention of the
parties in respect thereof.
It is to be borne in mind that the parties
are presumed to intend the consequences of
a performance of the contract. That which
is contemplated by the terms of the contract
is 'intended' by the parties.
'The distinction between the motive which leads a person
to enter into a contract, and the intention
deducible from the terms of the contract as
it is written, is a very clear one.' ...
(citing cases).
Clearly, the bond in this case was 'intended'
to directly benefit the materialmen, as that
expression is above defined. They, therefore, are entitled to maintain this action.
These two Utah cases are in accord with the majority of
decisions as reflected by the following authorities and with
Rule 17(a).
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Rule 17(a) provides in part "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."

Plaintiffs

are the real parties in interest.
The general rule which permits a third
person for whose benefit a contract is
made to enforce the contract enables a
person not named in the bond, but for
whose benefit the bond was given to bring
an action to enforce rights under the
bond.
(12 AmJur 2d, Bonds Par. 39)
Where such a bond in its entirety! is consistent with an intention that a third
party and others in a like position should
have the right to sue thereon, that right
will be enforced.
(11 CJS Bonds Par. 106)
As a general rule ... although the state is
the only one named as obligee and there is
no express provision giving ti1ird persons
rights thereunder, and notwithstanding the
absence of privity of contract between the
principal contractor and such persons ...
such persons may sue on the bond.
(81 CJS States, Par. 119)
In a proper case a third person, for whose
benefit or protection a contract has been
made by a municipal corporation with a
private corporation or company, may maintain an action thereunder in his own name.
Under this rule a recovery of damages has
been allowed and sustained in favor of:
An abutting landowner ...
(63 CJS Municipal Corporations, Par. 1026)
... the action should be brought in the
name of the real party in interest. Neither
the county nor the commissioners thereof ...
are necessary parties to an action ... against
the surety. (20 CJS Counties, Par. 205)
Some authorities have even gone so far as to hold that the named
obligee cannot sue and that "the loss or burden falls upon the

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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property owners, and the municipality cannot recover therefor,
either as trustee for them or on its own account, upon the bond
of the contractor."

(17Am.Jur.2d, Contractors; Bonds, Par. 125)

Travelers cites a lower court Connecticut decision.

5

All

that case held was that as a matter of suretyship law, a bonding company cannot be liable if there is no showing that the
principal is liable.

That situation does not exist in the case

at bar since the lower court found all principals and their
surety liable and expressly found that time for performance had
expired.

(Findings, Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 8; Tr. 123)

As stated

above, there need not be a "call" for the principals and the
surety to be liable for their breach of obligation to perform
by a stated date.

(supra p. 10)

Travelers states (p.15 and 16) that there has been an
extension of time for performance.

There is no evidence there-

of and such a contention is in direct contradiction of Findings,
Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 8.

(Tr. 123)

Damages
Travelers complains (p.18) that the award of $7,200 plus
interest was not supported by the evidence, arguing that the
$7,200 paid did not coincide with Fleck's testimony as to the
$8,750 value of the land without the agreed improvements.
are not comparable figures.

Those

Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty

Dollars, being the residual value of the land, would never be
5

Star Contracting Corp. v.

Manwa~

Construction Co .• Inc. (1973)

32 conn.supp. 64, 337 A.z 669
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an ultimate damage amount, but rather, would only be a factor
in computing the amount of damage.

The $8,750 sould be deducted

from the value of the property had the improvements been put in,
which was $70,000 (two dollars a foot for 35,000 square feet)
(Tr.153).

By subtracting the residual value of $8,750 from

$70,000, damages would be in the amount of $61,250.

The court

awarded only that portion thereof which was reflected by the
out-of-pocket payments made by plaintiffs ($7,200 plus interest).
Travelers can hardly complain that the court recognized only a
portion of the damages to which one of the plaintiffs testified.
Travelers then argues (p.19) that there was no testimony
relating to the $7,200 actually paid out of pocket by plaintiffs.
Exhibits lOP and llP show said payments and, based thereon, the
court found in Finding No.7 (Tr.123) that said payments had been
made.

In Finding No.9 (Tr.123) the court found that plaintiffs

suffered damage in the amount of $7,200 plus interest.

Such

findings, being supported by the evidence, are binding upon this
court.
Travelers next argues (p.19) that since the property without
improvements is worth $8,750; since plaintiffs paid only $7,200
of the $36,000 called for by the contract of purchase; since the
sellers agreed that until the bond improvements were put in the
remaining balance of the purchase price need not be paid, plaintiffs therefore suffered no damage.

This illogical conclusion

arises from Travelers' ignoring the fact that since the improvements were not put in, the land was not worth saving.

Since

the $8, 750 present value was much less than the remaining $28,800
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balance of the contract price and much less than the outstanding
liens, the plaintiffs minimized their losses by not making any
further investment to either pay off the remaining balance of
the contract or to discharge existing liens.

As the court found,

Defendants have abandoned their plans to
develop the subdivision and to install the
improvements. Plaintiffs could have protected their ownership interests as contract
buyers against the lien created by Exhibit 6P
and would have done so had the lots had
sufficient value. The failure to install
improvements caused the lots to have insufficient value to warrant further investment of
funds by plaintiffs, and further investments
would have been uneconomic. The abandonment
of the subdivision by defendants caused
plaintiffs to lose interest in their contract
and to lose title to the lots. Plaintiffs'
damage acrued prior to the time they determined not to make further investments in the
lots and thereby lost title thereto. Plaintiffs minimized their losses by not making
any further investment.
(Finding No.15)
Travelers argues (p.20) that there is no evidence relating
to the cost of improvements and cites the Morro case as authority that decrease in value of property is not the proper
measure of damages.

As pointed out above, the bond in the

Morro case specifically provided that the bond should be used
to "fully reimburse and repay the county ... outlay and expense
which it may incur in making good any default."

The indenture

in the case at bar did not provide that the county should be
reimbursed for its expenses in installing the improvements in
case of default, but merely stated:
Principals hereby agree to cause the various
improvements ... to be installed on or before
two years from recordation of the said final
plat.
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The factual differences make the Morro case unpersuasive here.
Plaintiffs' Damages Resulted From Defendants' Failure to
Install Improvements
Travelers recites (p.21) that plaintiffs were only contract
purchasers and thus only equitable owners, and that they knew of
the existance of prior liens, and that the plaintiffs lost their
interest in the land by virtue of the foreclosures of the prior
liens.

With all of this we agree.

Travelers ignores, however,

the Finding of Fact, No. 15 (Tr.124) quoted above, finding that
the reason that title was lost was that defendants having defaulted, the land was not worth protecting and plaintiffs minimized their losses by not making further investments.

Travelers'

argument that plaintiffs were only contract purchasers seems
irrelevant.

Travelers' argument that "The lack of improvements

did not cause plaintiff's loss--the trust deed sale did" is contrary to the finding of the court in Finding 15 that "the failure
to install improvements caused the lots to have insufficient
value to warrant further investment and further investments would
have been uneconomic.

The abandonment of the subdivision by

defendants caused plaintiffs to lose interest in their contract
and to lose title to the lots."

Those findings are controlling

here.
Travelers recites (p.22) that "notice of default was on
the record prior to (plaintiffs) recording their purchase contract."

The notice of default was not of record, however, prior

to the plaintiff's entering into the earnest money agreement in
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1

1971 (Finding No. 11, Tr.124), nor was it of record prior to
plaintiffs' paying $7,200.
"Impossibility" Is No Defense (Specific Performance is Not Sought)
Travelers states (p.23) that the whole subdivision as
planned and bonded has now been changed so that it is now impossible to make the improvements· that Travelers guaranteed
would be installed and that, furthermore, there is a new owner
who might not permit Travelers to enter to install the improvements.

Travelers concludes therefrom that this somehow excuses

it from breach of its guarantee that the improvements would
have been installed by 1972.
We reiterate that the findings are to the effect that had
Travelers and its principals performed as agreed there would
have been no change of title and, therefore, no "impossibility."
Present impossibility, if it is indeed "impossible," is
hardly a tenable defense to be relied upon by the bonding company which guaranteed that improvements would have been installed
long before.

It is actually irrevelant whether or not improvements

can now be installed because no one is seeking specific performance, but rather damages.
The

Oklaho~a

caseG cited by Travelers on impossibility as

a defense held that a railroad, which had entered ir.to a lease

6

Kansas, Oklahana & Gulf Railway Co. v. Grandland Grain Co. (Okl.1967)
434 P.Zd 153

-
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which provided that the railroad would, during the term of the
lease, transport lessee's grain, was excused from future performance by virtue of the condemnation of the line for a dam
site.

This is hardly authority for excusing failure to perform

prior to the impossibility.
The U.S. Supreme Court case cited as to impossibility 7 is
likewise no authority for excusing a breach of contract prior
to the existence of the impossibility.

In that case there was

a charter party for use of a ship which was requisitioned by
the British Admiralty for use in World War I.

The court merely

held that future performance was excused.

C0 U CL US I 0 N
Travelers seeks to avoid liability on a bond it issued,
guaranteeing that improvements would be installed,on the various
technical grounds discussed above and argues that plaintiffs
should look to their defunct seller instead of to Travelers.
They are both liable.

Travelers received its premium

for

executing the bond and should not now avoid the liability it
assumed.

_, _'

~u7d _,__~)
;

7

John W. Lowe
, Lowe & Hurley
/ Attorney for Respondents

Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shippir}g Co. Ltd. (1921) 41 S.Ct. 612, 256 U.S. 619
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